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the same as that of his brother? If so, one of the fundamental pnnciples of criminal jurisprudence must be ignored and set at naught.
If my brother seeks out his enemy upon the public highway with a
view to slay him, and I, ignorant of his design as well as the cause
of the difficulty and how it originated, but seeing him hotly engaged
and the fortune of the fight turung against him, and realizing that
he is in imminent danger of life or limb, rush to his rescue, and strike
down his antagonist in order to save his life, must I, under such circumstances, be adjudged guilty of murder with express malice, merely
because my brother would be so adjudged in case he had inflicted the
mortal blow? If the law is so written in the books, we have failed to
discover it. Nature has written her own law differently in the hearts,
of men."
Since the "stand in the shoes" rule in defense of third persons is in conflict with
the fundamental principle of criminal law that one cannot be guilty of criminal
homicide in the absence of criminal intent or negligence, it is submitted that it
should yield to the rule that one may kill in the defense of a third person when
he has a reasonable belief that the person defended is in imminent peril of death
or great bodily harm without fault on his own part.
JAMES DANIEL COMNE-rE

INSANITY AS A DEFENSE TO CRIME
If one who is subjected to criminal prosecution proves to the satisfaction of
the jury that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act, he will stand
absolved from all criminal liability. If the crime is one which requires a criminal
intent, the defense of insanity negatives the existence of such intent.
In the preponderance of crimes, two elements are essential for convictionact and intent. Except in "attempts," an act is not susceptible to a great degree
of uncertainty, it is there to be seen and needs oalv to be proved to the jury. The
intent or mental element of crime is an entirely different proposition. It can be
seen by no one, and the boundaries of mentality or insanity are necessarily susceptible to much uncertainty. That the subjective element of crime is such an
elusive thing is probably the reason that insanity is an affirmative defense to crime
in about twenty-two states.' In the jurisdictions adhering to this majority rule,
the defendant has the burden of proof of convincing the jury that he was insane,
rather than the lighter burden of going forward with the evidence on insanity.
Perhaps the reason behind this rule is that it is a matter of popular and judicial
belief that many persons relying on the defense of insanity are perfectly sane,
and that if the ultimate burden of proof of sanity were on the prosecution, it
would afford an easy avenue of escape to the guilty. However, the doctrine of
mens rea, which is a fundamental concept in the criminal law, stands unequivocally
for the proposition that a mental element is an indispensable component of the
majority of crimes. If the doctrine of mens rea is as fundamental as it is pur'Nineteen states and the Federal courts place the burden of pro6f on the
WEIHOFEN, INSANITY 'AS A DEFENSE IN CRLmnINAL LAW 151, 158
(1933). MAY, Cmu ii.AL LAw see. 47 (4th ed. 1938).
"Williamson v. Norris, 1 Q. B. 7 (1899)" 1 BIsHoP, CRImiNAL LAw sec. 287
(9th ed. 1923). For a complete analysis of the doctrine, see Sayre, Men s Rea, 45
HAnv. L. REv. 974 (1932).

prosecution.
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ported to be, should not the prosecution have the ultimate burden of proving
sanity before the defendant should be subjected to liability? Is not the presumption that every man is presumed sane until he proves the contrary' a violation of
the more fundamental presumption that every man is presumed innocent until
proven guilty, for it is not disputed that if there be no sanity, there can be no
crime? If the doctrine of mens rea is sound in its reqmrement of a mental element
for crime, then it is techically incorrect to place the ultimate burden of proof
of insanity upon the defendant, for, in the Anglo-American legal system, the prosecution has the burden of establishing the existence of all the essential elements
of crime.
This apparently illogical procedural aspect of the defense of insanity in the
majority of American jurisdictions is illustrative of the uncertainty that enshrouds
this field of criminal law. The courts themselves do not trust their formula for
insanity to the extent of placing the burden of proof on the prosecution. The defendant in the majority of junsdictions is left to absorb the effects of any weakness
in the test. His position is that although he might have been insane, he is nevertheless guilty if he cannot prove it to the jury.
No rule of law of such long standing has been subjected to as much criticism
as has the legal test for insanity. The fundamental test was laid down over a
hundred years ago in M'Naghten s Case' when the Judges said:
"
the jurors ought to be told in all cases that every
man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree
of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved
to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the ground
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong."
Most of the current law on insanity in England, Canada and the United States is
embodied in this opinion.' It is to be observed that the rule is in two parts, either
of which is a defense on the ground of insanity.' First, it must be determined
whether the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act, and, if he did, the
second section poses the additional question whether he knew he was doing what
was wrong. If either of these questions is answered in the negative, the defense
of insanity has been established.
Courts have usually considered the question of knowledge of the nature and
quality of the act as a question concerned only with the physical aspects of the

3
Davis v. U.S., 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895); People v. Bemmerly, 98 Cal. 299,
33 Pac. 263 (1893); Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 S. 822 (1902).
'Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
1 BuiDicic, LAw oF CnviME 277 (1946); SA ES CAsES ON Can~NAL LAw
487, n. 1 (1927). M'Naghten s Case also provided that if a person commits an
offense under an insane delusion as to existing facts, he must be considered m the
same situation as to responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the delusion
existed were real. The majority of the states now deny that there is any separate

test for insane delusion. WEMOFEN, INSANrrY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW
69, 70 (1933); MAY, CIMIN. LAW sec. 45 (4th ed. 1938).

' For the leading case to the effect that the rule is in the disjunctive rather
than the conjunctive, see People v. Sherwood, 271 N. Y. 427, 3 N. E. 2d 581
(1936).
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act.' The sort of questions that arise are whether the accused knew he was firing
a gun, or whether he knew he was wielding a knife. However, some courts have
attempted to distinguish the terms "nature" and "quality" by reasomng that quality is concerned with the moral or social character of an act while nature only
The issue as to distinguishability of the terms is
refers to physical aspects.'
weighed heavily by authority that they are synonymous. Moreover, the question is
of little practical importance since the second section of the rule is concerned with
the social characteristics of the act.
In the decision of the question whether the accused knew that he was doing
that which was wrong, the word "wrong" is a term of legality as well as morality.'
In the application of this "right and wrong" test of insanity it was suid in Guiteau s
Case, "If a man is under an insane delusion that another is attempting his life, and
kills him in self-defense, he does not know that he is committing an unnecessary
homicide. If a man insanely believes that he had a command from tlje Almighty
to kill, it is diflicult to understand how such a man can know that it is wrong for
him to do it. A man may have some other insane delusion which would be quite
consistent with a knowledge that such an act is wrong,-such as, that he had received an injury,-and he might kill in revenge for it knowing that it would be
wrong,'" and, here, he would have no defense under the rule.
These are the types of questions that are for the jury to decide in countless
criminal cases where insanity is pleaded as a defense, and the foregoing observations are the result of M'Naghten s rule as it is administered by the courts. This
entire matter has been the recipient of numerous attacks, principally from those
in the professions of psychology and psychiatry. The assailers are quick to declare
that the rule is oblivious to modern science. Professor Hall meets the attackers
with the proposition that M'Naghten s rule is a rule scientifically sound, the merit
of which has never been disproved, and the supenor of which has never been
found." However, it is believed that the psychiatric quarrel with the law of insanity is primarily concerned with administration as to methods of proof and final
determination of the issue as adopted by the courts rather than with the underlying rules themselves.
The first objection of the psychiatrist with the rule of M'Naghten s Case is that
it is based upon the overt symptoms of mental disease rather than the disease
itself.' It is pointed out that the exoneration of the defendant depends upon the
severity of these symptoms, and that many serious mental diseases may have-very
mild, scarcely perceptible symptoms. Jurors are the ones who stand accused of
committing this error. Psychiatrists contend that in practice juries decide the
question of insanity by examimng the symptoms as they appear to them. It cannot be demed that symptoms perceptible to the eye and ear are frequently not
indicative of the extent of the fundamental disease involved, and it should not be
disputed that an evaluation of symptoms by a student of the mind is of a greater
degree of accuracy than one by a layman. However, when it is contended that
'Rex v. Codere, 12 Crm. App. R. 21, 26-27 (1916).
8
Schwartz v. State, 65 Neb. 196, 91 N.W 190 (1902) (by implication).
.People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915); GLUECIC, MENTAL
DIsonDER AND THE CmrIaAL LAW 225 (1925); WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A
DEFENSE
iN CianNAL LAw 41 (1933).
' 0 Guiteaus Case, 10 Fed. 161, 182 (1882).
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CaMINAL LAW 479 et. seq. (1947).
2 Meredith, Insanity as a Criminal Defense: A Conflict of Views, 25 CAN. B.
BEv. 251, 252 (1947).
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the testimony of a psychiatrist is the best evidence on the issue of insanity, many
members of the legal profession are quick to impeach such a contention by the
assertion that in the past their testimony has been of such a contradictory nature
as to be of little value." Doubtless there will be cases where the testimony of the
psychiatrist for the defendant and that of the state are in conflict, and the ultimate decision will be the product of the conjecture of the jury. However unfortunate such a situation may be, it is regrettable that such cases should convince
the courts and the public that expert testimony in the field of insanity is of little
value." It has been correctly observed that the criminal law can do no more than
utilize the best psychological knowledge available concerning the relevant fact5
Indeed, courts are beginning to realize that the best insight into the human mind
is through the eyes of the psychiatrist." A jury that realizes that the testimony
of the expert of the mind is the best evidence on the problem of insanity renders
great service to the administration of criminal justice. It is the duty of the psychiatric profession to improve its knowledge of the human mind, but it is also
the duty of the courts and juries to utilize that knowledge.
Another criticism of the M'Naghten formula popular with psychiatrists is that
it treats criminal responsibility as a matter of intelligence and not of the will and
emotions. They insist that insanity attacks the will and emotions more frequently
than the intellectual powers" and that insane persons, although capable of discermng right from wrong, may, nevertheless, be deprived of control over their
actions by reason of impulses beyond their limited power to resist.' The M'Naghten rule has in many jurisdictions been supplemented by an additional rule which
encompasses this situation. This is the rule of irresistible impulse." The rule
13'.
they are forced to conclude either that those [psychiatrists] who disagree are not scientists, or that that about which they disagree is not science.
Michael, Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 21 A. B. A. J. 271, 276

(1935).
" For an explanation and repudiation of the so-called popular distrust of psyciatrists, see Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B. U. L.
RPv. 322, 327 (1936). "The psychiatrists difficulties with the M'Naghten Rules
begin with the administration of the oath. He is sworn to tell the whole truth,
but the rules, because of their concern only with the intellective aspects of mental
function, prevent him from telling the whole truth about the accused's mental condition. If he attempts to tell of the disorganized emotional aspects which may
have caused the crime, he may be sharply interrupted by the trial judge and
ordered to limit his comments to insanity as defined by the M'Naghten Rules.
He is in an impossible position-sworn to tell the whole truth and prevented by
the court from telling it. No wonder psyciatne evidence at times appears confused and contradictoryl" Stevenson, Insanity as a Criminal Defense, 25 CAN B.
REv. 732 (1947).
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CnirimNAL LAW 486 (1947).
"For a case early recognizing the decisive role of science in the law of insanity, see State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 395 (1871).
'MEREDITH,

op. cit. supra note 12, at 251.

" "That there are such impulses is today established in psychiatry." GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRImINAL LAW 235, 2436 (1925).
"Weihofen lists the following states as administering the rule: Alabama
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming. WEi-OFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CniumL LAw 16 (1933). The District of Columbia also has the rule. Smith v. U.S. 59 App. D. C. 144, 36 F 2d
548 (1929). Irresistible Impulse is not the law in England, KENNY, OUTrLINES OF
CImINAL LAw 56 (12th ed. 1926), nor in Canada, Rex v. Creighton 14 C. C. C.
349 (1908). Stephen contended that the M'Naghten rule was sufficiently broad
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doesn't require, as the term implies, that there be absolutely no possibility of resistance, but only that the volition of the actor be impaired to such an extent that
the impulse is reasonably incapable of being resisted. Irresistible impulse is a defense when the actor, although he knows the nature and quality of his act and
that it is wrong, is, nevertheless, because of disintegration of his volition, unable
Victims of such a disease as
to resist the impulse for all practical purposes.'
kleptomama, an "irresistiblq impulse" to steal, are exempted from criminal liability
under this rule. Many courts have refused to adopt this rule as a result of a belief
that there is no such thing as an irresistible mlpulse."L However, the existence of
such a mind is recognized by the foremost legal scholars in the field of insanity =
The term "moral insanity" which has frequently been before the courts has
had an adverse effect upon the acceptance of the rule of irresistible impulse. In
rejecting the argument of moral insanity, the courts have said that "If, from evil
association and indulgence in vice, his conscience. ceases to control or influence
his actions, and he is otherwise capable of committing crime, he is responsible."'
It is unfortunate that some courts have refused to adopt the rule of irresistible
impulse because of a belief that it would afford a defense to those who seek to
escape liability on the ground that continued criminal association has taught them
no other way of life than crime.'4 There is no room in any acceptable notion of
irresistible impulse for such a doctrine, Acts that are said to be the result of environment cannot be said to be irresistible on that basis alone unless there is
recognition of an objective philosophy of life which has received little favor in this
country. One who has lived in a cnminal environment for an extended period of
time may fail to resist an impulse, but it should not be thought that environment
alone makes an impulse irresistible.
The shadowy line between an irresistible impulse and an "irresisted" impulse
has influenced many courts to refuse to adopt the defense because of the practical
problem of proof involved.'
To illustrate the problem, suppose that one who
has stolen for years as the result of a criminal environment and habit asserts that
he is a kleptomamac. It would seem that his crimes were the result of an indifference to the laws of society, but it is also entirely possible that his actions were
uncontrollable. Indeed, to distinguish between the two is often an intricate
problem. It has been suggested that this problem of proof could be simplified
by an addition to the rule of a requirement that certain types of factual situations
must exist upon which to base an impulse. It is generally thought that habit

to include the irresistible impulse doctrine. "Knowledge and power are the constituent elements of all voluntary action, and if either is seriously impaired, the
other is disabled." 2 STmEPHN, HISTORY OF THE CimciiNAL LAW IN ENGLAND 171

(1883).
'Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 866 (1886).
""The law says to men who say they are afflicted with irresistible impulses:
'If you cannot resist an impulse in any other way, we will hang a rope in front
of your eyes and perhaps that will help. " Riddel, J., in Rex. v. Creighton, 14
C.C.C. 349 (1908). See also Note, 34 MicH. L. REv. 569, 570 (1936).
-- GLUECK, MENTAL DISOaDER AND =HECIMInNAL LAW 304 et. seq. (1925);
WEi-oFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW

45 (1933).

'Green v. State, 64 Ark. 523, 534, 43 S.W 973, 977 (1898).
-"SeeCunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 279 (1879).
"What is this 'irresistible impulse?' How shall we of the Courts and juries
or must it be
know it? Does it exist when manifested in one single instance,
shown to have been habitual, or at least to have evinced itself in more than a
single instance?" State v. Harrison, 86 W Va. 729, 751, 15 S.E. 982, 989 (1892).
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should not be the basis of a defense unless it is a habit affecting the fundamental
functions of the mind such as liquor or dope. Some would suggest that the rule
be so phrased as to encompass an nresistible act springing from these habits and
to exclude acts caused by such facts as habitual theft for gain. It is believed,
however, that such a categorization is undesirable. The existence or non-existence
of an irresistible impulse is a question which must be decided in each individual
case independent of the likelihood of its existence in persons of the same class.
Admittedly, the existence of an irresistible impulse is more likely to be present
when the defendant is a dipsomaniac than when he is just an ordinary habitual
thief, but it is entirely possible that such an impulse may exist in a habitual thief
although his motives appear to be mercenary. The defense should not be arbitrarily closed to anyone merely because the probabilities are that his impulse was
only unresisted. In each individual case, it should be decided whether or not the
conscious volition of the defendant has been destroyed, and, here again, it cannot
be denied that the opinion of the psychiatrist should have the greatest weight.
It is believed that with the addition of the rule of irresistibleimpulse to the
rule of M'Naghten s Case psychiatrists do not have any fundamental objections to
the law of insanity. As has been pointed out, their objections seem to surround
the method of proof in the cases. However, their suggestions go to the revision
of some of the most fundamental constitutional aspects of the legal system. The
most frequent recommendation made is that the question of insanity should be
taken from the jury and submitted to some sort of board of experts.' The basis
for such a recommendation is a. belief among psychiatrists that juries are incapable
of rendering a correct decision when insanity is an issue. That these experts of
the mind are more capable of deciding questions concerning insanity will not be
denied. The jury is, however, more than a fact finding body- it is a constitutional
bulwark against arbitrary action concerning the question of guilt as predicated
on fact. There has always been an inherent resistance against encroachments upon
the province of the jury in criminal prosecutions, and this resistance, motivated
by fear, is justified. Moreover, the belief in some quarters that juries are incapable
of determining the issue is not necessarily true. As in any case where technical
questions of fact are involved, the jury cannot and should not decide the issue on
the basis of their own knowledge, but they should decide it in accordance with
the evidence that has been placed before them. If competent psychiatric testimony is before the jury, the jury should render a verdict of the same quality as
the evidence. The place of the expert is on the witness stand. When he is there,
it is incumbent upon the judge to realize that in the trying of the issue of insanity,
relevance is at its broadest limits. The psychiatrist should have a complete opportunity to present his analysis of the defendant's mental condition to the jury. The
ultimate decision, however, as to both guilt and disposition should continue to
rest with the jury. The role of the psychologist and the psychiatrist should continue to be that of witnesses stating the facts as they see them to the jury, but
they should take care to interpret facts, as nearly as possible, in language that the
jury will understand. Their duty is to say whether or not the accused is insane
according to the legal test of insanity, not according to tests of their own profes-

Note, 19 CALiF. L. REv. 174, 181 (1981).

A poll of leading Canadian

psychiatrists revealed that eighty were in favor of submitting the issue of insanity
to a board of psychiatrists while only two were opposed. 25 CAN. B. REv. 871
(1947). For argument that to take the issue of insanity from the courts may not
require constitutional amendment, see Note, 9 MicH. L. REv. 126 (1910).
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sions. However. the courts should alwavs be aware of a duty on their part to
examine new tests for insanity which may be offered bv the psvchological and
psychiatric professions and to accept any new rule which is the superior of the old.
In the law of insanity, it must be recognized that the psychologists and the psychiatnsts are the ones who must point the way.
JAMES DANIEL CORNETTE

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-DEFENSE
AS EXCUSE FOR HOMICIDE
No concept in the law seems clearer than the right of a man to kill in the
necessary defense of his own life. This basic idea seems so fundamental as to
admit no room for question. And yet an examination of the history of self defense
reveals a startling difference between its present state and its early origin.
From the very beginning of the jurisdiction of the king s courts over cnminal
cases, homicide was justifiable and consequently without penalty only where committed in execution of the law.' Such cases as killings under the king s warrant,
or in the pursuit of justice, or the killing of an outlaw, or a thief caught in the act,
or other manifest felon who resists capture- would seem always to have been
justifiable. The penalty for all other cases of homicide was plainly and simply
death or mutilation and even as late as the 19th century in England the law provided for forfeiture of goods and payment of fines to the king, although for a long
time the rule had not been enforced.i
In the case of self defense however, the king might and often did grant
pardons' notwithstanding the fact that the judges must convict the defendant of
felony as the law required.' The following is an illustrative case:
"Robert of Herthdale, arrested for having in self defense
slain Roger, Swein s son, who had slain five men in a fit of madness,
is committed to the sheriff that he may be in custody, as before, for
the lkng must be consulted about tius matter."'
Beale, Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16 H~Av. L. REv. 568 (1903).
But see, 2 POLLOCK AND MAIrLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 478 (2d ed., 1911)
where a housebreaker was killed and the slaver-was allowed to go free. Even the
authors term the defendant here as fortunate.
'POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, supra, note 1. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HAv. L. REv.
980 (1931). It would appear that tls privilege did not extend to cases where
the felon made no resistance. But see Staffordshire Collections iv. p. 215, as
quoted by POLLOCK AN MAiTLAND, supra, note 1, at 478, fn. 4, in which one who
beheaded a fleeing robber was acquitted.
For a discussion of the an3 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, supra, note 1 at 481.
cient scheme of wer and bloodfeud, bot and wite, and its part in the admimstration of criminal justice see POLLOCK AN) MArrLAND, supra, note 1, at 449. For
an excellent discussion of the primitive concept of indiscrimnate liability, see,
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its-History, 7 H.Anv. L. REv. 317 (1893).
"The doer of a deed was responsible, whether he acted innocently or inadvertently,
"
thief.
because he was the owner, even though the weapon was wielded by a
4The king of course might grant pardons for other types of honucide and as
lus power grew the practice of giving pardons was relied on by the judges. It is
to be noted however that these pardons did not come as a matter of right but
rather 'de gracia sua et non per judicium. B.N.B., pl. 1216 as quoted in Beale,
supra, note 1 at 568, fn. 4.
'Sayre, supra, note 2 at 980; POLLOCK AND MAiTLAND, supra, note I at 479.
6 SELDEN SOCIETY, 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, No. 70 (1888).

